Security
Report anything. We will not send lawyers.
A company whose entire argument is that its architecture holds should welcome people trying to break it. If you find something, we want to hear it before a journalist does.
Reporting
Email jack@dotcomjack.com. Include what you found and how to reproduce it. You will get a human reply within two business days.
We commit to not pursuing legal action against good-faith research: testing your own device, not accessing other people’s data, not degrading service for others, and giving us a reasonable window before publishing. We will credit you publicly unless you ask us not to.
Threat model
The threats we design against, in order of how seriously we take them:
- Us, in five years. A future version of this company under financial pressure, or a new owner after an acquisition. This is the primary threat and it is why keys live on your hardware rather than ours.
- Compelled disclosure. Subpoena, warrant, or national security letter served on us. Mitigated by having nothing readable to produce.
- Compromise of our infrastructure. An attacker inside our systems reaches device health telemetry and a waitlist table. They do not reach footage, because we never hold it.
- Compromise of a customer dock. Real and serious. Mitigated by the firmware geofence, which a compromised dock cannot widen, and by signed firmware.
- Aircraft theft. A stolen aircraft cannot be paired to another dock and carries no readable recordings.
What is not done yet
There is no shipping hardware, so there has been no third-party audit. We have committed to commissioning one before the first unit ships and to publishing the report here whether or not it is flattering. Until that exists, everything on this page is a design intention rather than an audited fact, and you should read it that way.